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Abstract
This introductory chapter provides background to and summarizes key findings from the
chapters in this book, all of which share in common their use of household data from the
latest round of the China Household Income Project (CHIP) survey to analyze recent
trends in inequality in China. We begin with an overview of relevant economic and
policy developments in China and discuss data and measurement issues. We discuss
our central estimates of national income inequality based on the 2007 and 2013 CHIP
survey data and make comparisons to estimates from official and other sources.
Drawing on the various chapters in the book, we identify six key findings. First, during
the period of study income inequality in China declined, a reversal of the several
decades-long trend of rising inequality; however, the measured decline not entirely
robust. Adjustments for geographic differences in costs of living or for understatement
of incomes at the top of the income distribution reduce or even reverse the decline.
Second, the urban-rural income gap narrowed, also representing a change from past
trends. Third, income gaps within, rather than among, the East/West/Center regions
remained the main source of national inequality. Fourth, household wealth rose
markedly and became a key factor contributing to income inequality. Fifth, growing
numbers of Chinese households attained levels of income comparable to those of
middle-class households in the developed world. Sixth, absolute poverty in China
continued to decline and by 2013 absolute poverty was relatively low, but poverty among
the remaining poor and rising relative poverty pose continuing challenges.
Keywords: China, household incomes, inequality, income distribution
JEL Classification: D31, O15, O53, P36
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I.

Introduction

In the early 2000s, China’s leaders announced a shift in development strategy. During
earlier decades, China had emphasized growth of the “productive forces,” that is, growth
of GDP and its underlying inputs and production processes. GDP was growing rapidly,
but the benefits of that growth were not distributed equally. Consequently, growth was
accompanied by rising inequality. By the late 1990s, income inequality in China was
approaching levels found in relatively unequal countries by international standards.
In 2002–3, under the new leadership of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao,
China launched the “Hu-Wen New Policies” (Hu-Wen xinzheng) and the “Scientific
Outlook on Development” (kexue fazhan guan) development strategies, sometimes
referred to as the “harmonious society” (hexie shehui) programs, which emphasized
sustainable and equitable growth. Over the following decade, China actively
implemented a range of policy measures to reduce income disparities and promote shared
growth, including social welfare programs, social insurance programs, agriculture
support, minimum wage and labor regulations, and poverty interventions.
According to official statistics, initially income inequality continued to rise during
the first half of the Hu-Wen era, but in about 2008 inequality peaked and thereafter it
declined moderately. If true, the official statistics reveal a new direction in Chinese
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inequality trends and suggest that China’s harmonious society policy program may have
begun to yield fruit. Yet, China’s official statistics contain biases, raising the question of
whether or not the turnaround in Chinese inequality is real. Furthermore, if it is real,
what explains such a turnaround?
This book addresses these questions based on empirical analyses of household
survey data. The chapters in this book all share the use of household-level data from the
latest round of the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) survey, carried out in 2014
and containing data

for 2013, with comparisons to earlier years using data from

previous rounds of the CHIP survey, especially 2007 but in some cases also going back
to 2002 and 1995. Each chapter examines a different aspect of household income and
inequality. Together, they provide a new, in-depth picture of trends in household incomes
and inequality in China during the Hu-Wen period, thus providing a baseline for the Xi
Jinping era, which began in 2013.
Since their inception in the 1980s, the CHIP surveys have allowed researchers to
undertake empirical analyses of trends in China’s household income and inequality.
Such analyses can be found in four previous books based on the CHIP data: The
Distribution of Income in China (edited by Keith Griffin and Zhao Renwei, 1993),
China's Retreat from Equality: Income Distribution and Economic Transition (edited by
Carl Riskin, Zhao Renwei, and Li Shi, 2001), Inequality and Public Policy in China
(edited by Björn A. Gustafsson, Li Shi, and Terry Sicular, 2008), and Rising Inequality in
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China: Challenges to a Harmonious Society (edited by Shi Li, Hiroshi Sato, and Terry
Sicular, 2013).

Yet, much has changed in China over time. The economic choices and

opportunities for households, as well as the institutional, economic, and policy
environments, are very different today than they were three decades ago. This book, a
sequel to the previous CHIP volumes, analyzes recent trends in income and inequality in
the context of these changes.
This first, introductory chapter provides the background to and summarizes the key
cross-cutting findings from the various chapters of this book. We begin with an overview
of recent economic and policy developments that covers the period spanned by the two
most recent CHIP surveys—2007 to 2013. Data and measurement issues of a general
nature as well as those specific to the CHIP survey data are the topic of the next section.
Here we describe the CHIP surveys and discuss the challenges of accurately measuring
household income and inequality. In the third section, we report on our estimates of
national income inequality based on the CHIP survey data, in comparison to the official
estimates and in comparison to estimates by independent researchers who use other data
sources.
We then highlight six key, cross-cutting findings that emerge from the analyses
presented in the various chapters of this book. The first and central finding is that income
inequality, as measured using the CHIP survey data, did indeed decline during the period
of study; however, the decline was not entirely robust. Adjustments for geographic
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differences in the cost of living or for an understatement of incomes at the top of the
income distribution can reduce or reverse the decline in income inequality. Second, the
urban-rural income gap also declined. Other studies have also noted this finding; the
analyses in this book provide insights into those factors that produced this narrowing gap.
Third, income gaps within, rather than among, the East/West/Center regions remain the
main source of national inequality. Fourth, household wealth has grown markedly, and
during the period of study it became a key factor contributing to income inequality. Fifth,
rising household incomes have led growing numbers of Chinese households to attain
levels of income comparable to those of middle-class households in the developed world.
By 2013 such households constituted a substantial share of the population. Sixth,
absolute poverty in China continued to decline, and by 2013 the rate of absolute poverty
was relatively low. But stubborn poverty among the remaining poor and rising relative
poverty still pose continuing challenges.
The chapters in this book provide much substance beyond these six findings, and
they provide detailed insights into different aspects of China’s changing distributional
picture. Topics covered include the factors underlying national trends in income
inequality (Chapter 2), the nature of China’s emerging middle class (Chapter 3), changes
in the distribution of wealth (Chapter 4), patterns of income, inequality, and poverty in
rural (Chapters 5 and 6) versus urban (Chapters 7 and 8) China, income gaps between the
Han and the minorities (Chapter 9) and between women and men (Chapter 12), and the
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effects of distributional policies, such as social welfare programs and the minimum wage,
on income distribution (Chapters 10, 11, and 13).

II.

Recent Economic and Policy Developments

In recent years, China has experienced a wide range of new economic and policy
developments, many of which have had implications for income inequality. In this
section, we provide a brief, selective survey of relevant developments. The individual
chapters will examine aspects of these developments in more depth.
Since 2007 China has experienced both short-term and long-term macroeconomic
shifts. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis was a major worldwide economic event that also
affected the Chinese economy. To some extent, China’s international trade and finance
policies insulated the domestic economy from the brunt of the crisis. In addition, a large
government stimulus program moderated its short-term impact. Nevertheless, over the
short term, China experienced a sharp drop in exports and in inflows of foreign direct
investments. Infrastructure construction under the stimulus program helped sustain
domestic employment, especially for migrant and low-skilled workers. Urban jobs were
also protected to varying degrees by government employment policies. For example, in
some cities local governments introduced policies to assist "zero-employment families"
to find work, provided training programs for the unemployed, gave subsidies to

7

enterprises to reduce the costs of hiring workers, and enforced restrictions on firings and
layoffs.
Consequently, household employment and earnings weathered the Global Financial
Crisis relatively well. During the crisis, urban employment increased gradually but
continuously, at an average annual growth rate of 3.5 percent, that is, from 310 million in
2007 to 382 million by the end of 2013. As shown in various chapters of this book, the
wage earnings of urban, rural-to-urban migrants, and rural households were all higher in
real terms in 2013 than they were in 2007.
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, China’s longer-term macroeconomic
growth path has shifted to what Chinese official sources refer to as the “New Normal,”
with GDP growth rates of approximately 7 percent per year as compared to their earlier
double-digit rates. This downshift in macroeconomic growth has been accompanied by
slower growth in household incomes, but the extent of the slowdown in household
incomes has been uneven, with rural household incomes showing continued rapid growth
whereas urban (including migrant) household incomes have grown more slowly
(Chapters 2, 5, and 7).
Three decades of rapid economic growth have brought major structural changes to
the Chinese economy. One such change has been the rise of rural-urban migration and
urbanization. Although China’s household registration (hukou) system still constrains
long-term migration and disadvantages rural migrants, the reforms have significantly
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weakened barriers to labor mobility. Estimates of the scale of migration vary, but by 2013
the population with rural hukou living for six months or longer in towns and cities was
roughly 140 to 180 million, equivalent to about 10 percent of the national population.
In 2012 China introduced the “New Urbanization Program,” and in early 2014 it
launched the “National New Urbanization Plan (2014–2020),” which contains a concrete
urbanization program involving hukou reform, the resettlement of rural communities, and
the conversion of rural populations to urban, so as to achieve the target of an urban
population constituting 60 percent of the national population by 2020 (see Zhou 2015 for
a summary of the plan). The increase in urbanization is evident during the CHIP survey
years. According to official statistics, the share of China’s urban population rose from 46
percent in 2007 to 54 percent in 2013. 1
Rising urbanization, together with demographic shifts, has contributed to changes in
China’s labor supply. Several studies find that China’s pool of surplus rural labor has
declined (Das and N’Daiye 2013; Cai and Wang 2013; Knight, Deng, and Li 2011;
Zhang, Yang, and Wang 2011). Concurrently, progressively smaller cohorts of young
people imply declining numbers of new entrants to the labor force. Demographers
predicted that China’s working-age population would reach a turning point and begin to
shrink in absolute size around 2015 (Lam, Liu, and Schipke 2015; Wang 2011). The
official population statistics show that the size of the working age (15–64) population

1

See Table 2-1, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm. Accessed June 14, 2017.
9

peaked in 2013, and it has since declined. 2

In recent years, there have been reports of

labor shortages and difficulties in recruiting migrant workers in the cities (e.g., Pomfret
and Ruwitch 2014; Rein 2010; Wong 2010; Xinhua 2015). These shifts in labor supply
have created upward pressures on wages and improved employment opportunities,
especially for unskilled and migrant workers. 3
The levels of education of both the urban and rural workforces have been rising, a
reflection of government efforts since the late 1990s to expand rural secondary education
and university enrollments. The progression rate from junior to senior secondary school
rose from 50 percent in 2000 to 81 percent in 2007 and further to 91 percent in 2013. 4
According to UNESCO data, gross enrollment rates in secondary education rose from 61
percent in 2000 to 73 percent in 2007 and further to 96 percent in 2013; tertiary
enrollment rates rose from 8 percent in 2000 to 21 percent in 2007 and 30 percent in
2013. 5 The expansion of secondary and tertiary education has helped narrow gaps in
education levels (e.g., between women and men). As discussed in some chapters, these
changes in educational attainment have implications for recent trends in income and
inequality.
During the period under study, China experienced a sharp rise in housing prices. This

2

See Table 2-5, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm. Accessed June 14, 2017.
For example, Li et al. (2016) report that the wages of rural migrant workers increased by
around 15 percent in 2010 and 2011.
4
See Table 21-23, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm. Accessed June 14,
2017.
5
See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR?locations=CN. Accessed June 14,
2017.
10
3

increase was partly related to urbanization, which increased the demand for housing in
the cities, and partly related to the manipulation of the supply of land by local
governments so as to generate local-government revenue from land sales.

Housing

price increases have been most extreme in large cities, although reports indicate that
price increases are spreading to medium and small cities as well (Chen and Woo 2017).
Rising housing prices can have both direct and indirect effects on household incomes
and inequality. The standard definitions of household income include imputed rents from
owner-occupied housing (see below). Imputed rents increase as housing prices increase
because they are estimated using data on market rents or the sale prices of housing.
Changes in the level and pattern of housing prices thus directly affect levels of household
income. In addition, since housing is a major component of household wealth, rising
housing prices influence the level and distribution of wealth (see Chapter 4), which in
turn may influence household opportunities and household choices to earn income.
The previous CHIP book (Li, Sato, and Sicular 2013) discusses changes in China’s
distributional policies during the period from 2002 to 2007. Under Hu Jintao, China’s
leadership put forward the idea of building a “Harmonious Society” and embarked on an
ambitious program to improve the social welfare system and to expand coverage of
social security and social insurance programs to those previously not covered, especially
the rural, migrant, and urban informal and unemployed populations. As of 2007, these
efforts were still underway, and during the current period under study these initiatives
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continued to influence household income growth and income inequality. Social programs
are the focus of Chapters 10 and 11, which provide details as well as analyses of their
impact on income and inequality; here we provide some background on the major
changes to these programs since 2007.
In 2009, the New Rural Pension Scheme began to provide pensions to rural residents
who were not participating in the urban workers’ basic pension insurance program.
Participation is voluntary, and the program runs at the family rather than the individual
level, so whether an older (over age 60) family member receives a pension depends on
the participation of other family members in the system. The rural pension system
expanded rapidly after 2009; coverage increased from 10 percent of Chinese counties in
2009 to 100 percent in 2012 (Wang 2014).

The amount of pension payments has been

low but increasing over time; in addition, payment levels differ among provinces and
counties, with higher payments in the more developed regions. In 2015, for example, the
rural pension income was 470 yuan per person per month in Beijing and 85 yuan in the
western province of Gansu. 6
In 2011 China introduced a basic urban pension scheme aimed at urban residents
without formal employment who are ineligible for the employee pension programs.

In

2014 the new rural and urban basic pension schemes were merged. Enrollment in the
combined rural and urban basic pension programs rose from essentially zero in 2007 to
6

For pension income in Gansu, see http://www.10zk.com/news/194566.html. Accessed July
17, 2017; for Beijing, see http://www.spicezee.com/zhishi/yanglao/103950.html. Accessed July 5,
2017.
12

497.5 million in 2013. As of 2015, enrollment exceeded 500 million people, and pension
recipients numbered 148 million.7 Analyses of the CHIP data reveal evidence of the
impact of these pension programs on household income, inequality, and poverty
(Chapters 2, 5, 6, 10, and 11).
In recent years, the government also expanded its health insurance programs.

In

2003 the government launched the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme so as to
reduce the burden of health-care costs on rural households. According to official statistics,
the program’s coverage increased from 252 million people in 2007 to 487 million people
in 2013, with a coverage rate exceeding 95 percent; during the same period, contributions
from individuals and governments rose from about 50 yuan per person to over 300 yuan
per person (Meng and Xu 2014). 8 In 2007, the government initiated Urban Resident
Basic Medical Insurance, a voluntary program providing health insurance to urban
residents who do not have formal employment. The program was offered in seventy-nine
cities in 2007, but it was increased to 229 cities in 2008 (about one-half of China’s cities),
and further to almost all cities in 2009 (Liu and Zhao 2014).

Enrollment in the program

rose from 43 million people in 2007, its first year, to 296 million people in 2013, and
further to 377 million people in 2015. 9
These health insurance programs are financed by a combination of participant

7

Statistics on pension program enrollments are from Tables 24-29 and 24-31,
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm. Accessed June 15, 2017.
8
See Table 22-28, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2014/indexch.htm. Accessed June 15, 2017.
9
See Table 24-29, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm. Accessed June 16,
2017.
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contributions and local- and central-government subsidies. Participant contributions and
levels of reimbursement vary regionally, so the impact of the programs is not uniform.
Nevertheless, by increasing the affordability of medical care, these programs can
improve health outcomes and labor productivity, and thus they can reduce the use of
household savings for self-insurance. Through these channels, the programs can have an
indirect but positive impact on household income.
If health insurance reimbursements for medical care are counted as a type of income,
these programs will also have a direct impact on measured household income. Prior to
2013, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) did not count such reimbursements as
income, but this changed in 2013. Consequently, part of the growth in household incomes
shown in the official statistics from 2007 to 2013 reflects changes in the treatment of
health insurance reimbursements in the official definition of household income. As
discussed below, this and other changes in the NBS definition of income affect the
comparability of NBS household income statistics before and after 2013. For this reason,
the CHIP has constructed alternative estimates of household income that treat medical
reimbursements and other income components consistently during the two years. 10
A third development in China’s social security system has been the implementation
of a cash transfer program targeting low-income rural households.

The Minimum

Livelihood Guarantee, or “dibao” program, was first established in cities in 1999, and it
10

The CHIP datasets contain information on medical reimbursements in 2013 but not in 2007, so
the alternative CHIP income definitions exclude medical reimbursements from income in both
years.
14

was expanded significantly in urban areas in the early 2000s.

By 2007, the number of

nationwide recipients in the urban dibao program was 23 million, declining modestly to
21 million in 2013. A similar, rural dibao program was initiated on a pilot basis in 2004
and was adopted in rural areas nationwide in 2007. The rural dibao program grew rapidly
during the period under study, from 36 million recipients in 2007 to 54 million recipients
in 2013, an overall increase of 51 percent during a period when the rural population
decreased by 12 percent.

Concurrently, the generosity of the program rose, with rural

dibao expenditures per recipient increasing from 446 yuan per person per year in 2007 to
1,609 yuan per person per year in 2016 (Golan, Sicular, and Umapathi 2017). 11 Dibao
transfers have consistently been counted as part of household income; therefore, the
expansion of this program has had both direct and indirect impacts on measured income
levels and inequality.
At the same time, the government pursued a “pro-rural” (huinong) program to
support rural households engaged in agriculture through a set of subsidies, referred to as
the "four subsidies," for grain production, agricultural inputs, purchases of improved seed
varieties, and purchases of agricultural machinery. An additional production subsidy for
the conversion of crops to forests on sloped land has been in place since the late 1990s.
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, the subsidies for grain production, inputs, and
sloped land conversion take the form of direct cash transfers and are identifiable

11

See Tables 22-24 and 2-1, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm. Accessed
June 16, 2017.
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components of rural household income in the CHIP 2013 data. In 2013, nearly one-half
of the rural households received income from these programs (Chapter 5). The improved
seed and machinery subsidies are implicit, that is, deducted from prices based on actual
purchases. Not all households receive the latter subsidies, and although they influence net
income from farming, the amounts are not directly identifiable in the data.
Minimum wage policies, initially adopted in the 1990s, target the low-wage segment
of China’s urban labor market. In the early years, minimum wage levels were low and
not strictly enforced. After implementation of the New Labor Contract Law in 2008, both
minimum wage levels and enforcement have increased. For instance, in July 2010
Hainan province and Henan province increased their provincial minimum wages by 30
percent and 33 percent, respectively. In 2011, at least five provinces raised their
minimum wages by more than 20 percent, and in 2012–13 twenty-seven provinces
increased their minimum wages (Li, Ye, and Xiong 2014). To some extent, these
minimum wage increases have been the result of political competition by local
governments that are responding to the central government’s call for a higher wage share
in national income. Chapter 13 investigates the consequences of these minimum wage
policies on the urban wage distribution (see also Lin and Yun 2016; Li and Ma 2015).
China has pursued an active poverty reduction policy agenda in the rural areas since
the 1980s. In the early years, China’s rural poverty programs followed a strategy of
reducing poverty by developing the local economy. The principal approach was to
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promote economic development in designated poor rural regions and counties, with the
idea that low economic development in the poor localities was the main cause of poverty.
This strategy was successful, but by the 2000s poverty had become more dispersed and
required a different approach. In response, China’s policy alleviation strategy began,
targeting smaller areas (e.g., villages, instead of counties) and even households, as in the
rural dibao program.
In 2010 the government put forward a new strategy for poverty alleviation in rural
China, as outlined in the "Poverty Alleviation Program for 2011–2020.” Additionally, it
increased the rural poverty line to 2300 yuan per person per year, which in purchasing
power parity (PPP) terms is close to US$2 per person per day. At the end of 2013, the
government put forward a “precise-targeting” poverty alleviation strategy, which
emphasized targeting poor households rather than poor localities. One of the major
measures of the new strategy is dibao, along with other interventions such as poverty
alleviation through industrial development, providing relief to households whose
members have serious illnesses, and relocating poor households in unfavorable
environments to better locations. As discussed in more detail below and in the ensuing
chapters of this volume, absolute poverty in rural China continued to decline during the
period of study. There are new challenges, however, to assist the remaining poor and to
address the rising levels of relative poverty.
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III. Data and Measurement Issues

All the chapters of this book use data from the CHIP surveys, which have collected
Chinese household income and related data for the years 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007, and
2013. Descriptions of the first four waves of the CHIP survey can be found in Eichen and
Zhang (1993), Li et al. (2008), and Luo et al. (2013). Here we highlight some key
features of the CHIP 2013 data.
The CHIP datasets contain information from two sources. Some of the variables
were collected by the NBS as part of its nationwide annual household survey and then
provided to the CHIP. These variables include household income and expenditure data. In
addition, using an independent survey questionnaire designed by the CHIP research team,
the CHIP collected complementary variables relevant for analyses of income and
inequality. The CHIP questionnaire was administered to the sample households in
mid-2014. Together, these two sets of variables contain rich information about both
households and individual household members—including household income and its
components; household expenditures and its components; the gender, age, education,
employment, and hukou registration of the household members; ownership of housing
and other assets; participation in social programs and insurance, and so on. All data in
CHIP 2013 are for the 2013 calendar year.
CHIP’s sample of households is a subset of the NBS’s 2013 annual household
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sample survey, which covered 160,000 households in 1,650 county-level administrative
units (city districts [shiqu] and counties [xianyu]) in all thirty-one provinces and
provincial-level municipalities. The NBS sampling method changed in 2013, when the
NBS adopted a nationally integrated household survey sampling frame to replace the
separate urban and rural household surveys that had been in use for more than three
decades. Full details about the new NBS integrated survey framework and methodology
have not been released publicly, 12 but considerable information is available in published
sources such as NBS (2014).
Due to budget constraints, the CHIP survey samples contain fewer households and
cover fewer provinces than the large NBS household survey. CHIP 2013 was designed to
contain 20,000 households, of which 10,000 were urban and 10,000 were rural, in 233
county-level administrative units of fifteen provinces. 13 China is often viewed as being
composed of three distinct regions, East, Center, and West.

For CHIP 2013, provinces

were selected to span the three regions so that the survey would be representative for
each of the three regions. To the extent possible, the CHIP selected provinces for the 2013
survey that were consistent with those in the 2007 survey. All provinces covered in 2013 except
Xinjiang are present in the 2007 survey, and all but three of the provinces covered in the 2007
survey (Hebei rural, Shanghai urban, and Fujian) are present in the 2013 survey. Table 1.1

shows CHIP 2013’s planned and actual composition of households by province and
12

Details have been published in internal work documents, e.g., NBS (2012).
NBS data are available for all fifteen provinces. The independent CHIP questionnaire was not
administered in Xinjiang.
19
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region.
[Table 1.1 about here]
The procedure used to select the CHIP 2013 sample from the larger NBS survey
sample consisted of several steps. First, the planned sample size for each CHIP sample
province was set roughly in accordance with its population. Within each province, the
planned number of urban nu versus rural nr households in the CHIP sample was based on
the shares of urban versus rural populations in the 2010 population census.
Second, separately for the NBS sample city districts (shiqu) and counties (xianyu) in
each province, we calculated the average number of NBS sample households per district
or county (mu and mr, respectively). Third, the number of urban districts (cu=nu/mu) and
counties (cr=nr/mr) to select from the NBS sample in each province was calculated as the
ratio of the above numbers. Fourth, using systematic random sampling (suiji qidian, deng
ju chouyang), within each sample province we selected cu city districts from the NBS
sample city districts, and cr sample counties from the NBS sample counties. All NBS
sample households in these selected city districts and counties are in the CHIP 2013
sample.
The independent CHIP questionnaires for the CHIP 2013 survey were designed
differently for formal urban, rural, and rural-urban migrant households. To decide which
questionnaire to use for which households, at the beginning of the survey interview the
enumerators asked the household head for information about his or her hukou registration
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and location of residence. This information determined which questionnaire was used, as
explained in Table 1.2.
[Table 1.2 about here]
In order to allow separate analyses by population subgroup, individuals in the CHIP
2013 survey are classified as urban, rural or migrant based on the classification of their
households as shown in Table 1.2. For example, all members of households that are
classified as rural based on the criteria in Table 1.2 are also classified as rural.
Membership within the household is based on the time spent living within the household.
Individuals who reside within the household for six or more months of the year are
counted as household members. 14
Some unanticipated challenges arose during the process of collecting the survey data.
First, Xinjiang was selected as one of the CHIP sample provinces, but the CHIP survey
questionnaire could not be administered to the sample households in Xinjiang. However,
the NBS provided additional information from its annual survey for the sample
households in Xinjiang.
Second, although the new, unified NBS sampling method was supposed to capture
14

Prior to adoption of the unified sample frame, the NBS annual household surveys classified
individuals who lived away from their households for more than six months as residents of their
place of residence, unless they returned most of their income to or maintained a close economic
relationship with their households of origin. In these cases, they were reclassified as residents in
the location of their households. Analyses of the CHIP 2002 and 2007 surveys followed this
practice (see Song, Sicular, and Yue 2013). After adoption of the unified sample frame in 2013,
the NBS no longer reclassifies individuals who return income or maintain a strong economic
connection with their households of origin. The location of residence is based solely on the time
spent in the location. The analyses in this book consistently use the new NBS classification
method for both the CHIP 2007 and 2013 datasets.
21

rural-to-urban migrant households better than the earlier sampling method, the number of
migrant households in CHIP 2013 was smaller than expected (Table 1.3). Migrant
households accounted for 4 percent of the CHIP 2013 sample households and they
contained 3.6 percent of the CHIP 2013 sample individuals. In the official population
statistics, however, the migrant population is about 15 percent of the national population.
In view of the under-representation of migrant households in the CHIP sample, and
also because the composition of the CHIP sample among regions/provinces and
urban/rural/migrants is not proportional to the composition of the population as reported
in the national population census and sampling surveys, the CHIP team developed
regional/provincial and urban/rural/migrant sampling weights to use when analyzing the
survey data. Most chapters of this book employ these weights in their analyses.
[Table 1.3 about here]

IV.

Measurement of Income

A major aim of the CHIP has been to provide estimates of Chinese household income per
capita and of income inequality that are consistent over time and in line with
international income measurement practices. The NBS, which collects extensive income
and expenditure data for its annual household surveys by means of daily household
income and expenditure diaries, constructs estimates of household income and its
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components. The NBS has provided its household income estimates, along with their
major components to the CHIP, and these NBS variables are included in the CHIP
datasets.
The NBS estimates of household income are widely used and benefit from being
based on data collected using real-time diaries rather than end-of-year recall. However,
the NBS estimates are not entirely consistent over time and do not follow the accepted
international definition of household income. To address these problems, the CHIP has
constructed alternative estimates of household income.
With respect to the latest round of the CHIP survey, an important concern was that in
2013 the NBS changed its definition of household income and changed the classification
of some income items among the various components of income.

Consequently, the

2013 NBS estimates of income and its components are not consistent with those for
earlier years. To the extent possible given the information available in the CHIP 2007 and
CHIP 2013 datasets, the CHIP team constructed an alternative measure of the 2007 NBS
income that is largely consistent with the 2013 definition. For one or two relatively minor
items, the necessary data are available for 2013 but not for 2007; for such items, 2013
income is adjusted to follow the 2007 NBS income definition. In addition, the CHIP team
corrected some errors in the 2013 NBS income variable. Further discussion of and details
about these income adjustments can be found in Chapter 2. Hereafter, we refer to the
original, unadjusted NBS income variables as “NBS income” and the adjusted, consistent

23

NBS income variables as “adjusted NBS income.”
The CHIP team also constructed a second alternative measure of income that is
closer to standard international practice. In recent years, the major difference between the
NBS income definition and standard international practice has been the treatment of
imputed rents on owner-occupied housing. Standard international practice includes
imputed rents on owner-occupied housing in household income.

In 2007 NBS income

did not include imputed rents. In 2013 NBS income included an estimate of imputed
rents, but the calculation of imputed rents was not consistent with standard estimation
methods.
The CHIP team estimated imputed rents using standard methods. For urban
(including migrant) homeowner households, imputed rents equal the expected market
rent for the dwelling (as self-reported by the household). For rural homeowner
households, imputed rents are equal to the self-reported expected market sales price or
the expected replacement cost of the dwelling, multiplied by the rate of return on a
long-term safe asset. 15
NBS income does not include the value of certain implicit subsidies associated with
subsidized or in-kind income. The proper treatment of implicit subsidies in income

15

The market-rent approach is used for urban households so that estimates of imputed rents are
not skewed by the recent rapid increases in housing sales prices. The housing price approach is
used for rural households because rental markets are not well developed in the rural areas. In
areas where housing markets are not well developed, the households were asked to estimate the
cost of replacing the dwelling. The CHIP team also calculated the imputed rents for urban
households using the housing price approach, which yielded a somewhat larger urban-rural gap
and a higher level of inequality, but it did not alter the trend in inequality over time.
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measurement is a complex issue and the subject of much scholarly debate (e.g., Li and
Luo 2010; Sicular et al. 2010). The CHIP team constructed estimates for one such
subsidy—housing subsidies for urban households—that has historically been important
in China. Using the 2007 and 2013 data for the subsample of urban renter households,
the CHIP team conducted a multivariate hedonic regression of rents as a function of
housing characteristics and location/neighborhood of residence. The results of this
regression were used to predict market rent for each urban renter household. The housing
rental subsidy was set equal to the difference between the predicted and actual rent
values (self-reported by the households) in cases where the actual rent paid was less than
the predicted rent.
Using these estimates of imputed rents for owner-occupied housing and implicit
subsidies for urban-rented housing, the CHIP constructed an alternative measure of
income, referred to as “CHIP income.” CHIP income is equal to the adjusted NBS
income plus the CHIP estimates of imputed rents and urban rental housing subsidies.
For 2013, the incorrect NBS estimate of imputed rents is subtracted. By 2007 and 2013
the amount of urban housing rental subsidies was small (increasing average urban
incomes by less than 1 percent in both years), so most of the difference between the
CHIP income and the adjusted NBS income is due to the imputed rents.
The choice among the three income definitions—NBS income, adjusted NBS
income, and CHIP income—depended on the researchers’ judgment, the research
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question, and the purpose of the analysis. The various chapters in this book use different
income definitions. The overview chapter (Chapter 2) compares and evaluates the
calculated estimated levels of income and income inequality using the three different
income definitions.
Most of the analyses in this book examine inequality among individuals rather than
among households, and they measure individual income as household income divided by
the number of household members. This approach gives more weight to the larger
households in the analyses. It also treats all household members as identical in terms of
their utility and needs, and it ignores economies of scale. Therefore, the resulting
estimates of inequality are understated; however, if the intra-household distribution is
stable, this approach will accurately identify changes in inequality over time. Some
researchers suggest the use of equivalent scales, which assign different weights to
different household members (e.g., higher weights for adults versus children, or for the
first versus additional household members). The chapters in this book do not use
equivalent scales; this task is left to other interested researchers.
Calculation of income per capita requires defining membership in the household.
The analyses in this volume follow the NBS definition, which counts as household
members all individuals residing in the household for more than six months of the year.
This approach allows easy comparison of the estimates with those of the NBS and other
studies, most of which follow the NBS definition. The CHIP dataset contains information
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on individuals, such as the length of time resident in the household, that allow for
alternative approaches. Again, this task is left to other researchers.

V.

Estimates of China's Income Inequality

In recent years, we have seen an increase in the number and range of estimates of
China’s national Gini coefficient, with lively debates about the true level of China's
income inequality. Official estimates of China’s Gini coefficient were not available until
2013. Previously, the NBS published separate Gini coefficients for urban and rural
income inequality but it did not publish a Gini coefficient for national income inequality.
The apparent reason for this was that the urban and rural household surveys were
conducted separately using different sampling methods and somewhat different
definitions of household income, and the NBS did not want to combine the two sets of
data. Some observers, however, have speculated that the absence of an official estimate
of the national Gini coefficient was because income inequality had risen to the point of
being politically sensitive.
Despite—or perhaps because of—the absence of official estimates of national
inequality, independent researchers stepped in to provide estimates. Some of these
estimates employed published NBS data about China’s urban and rural income
distributions in its statistical yearbooks; others used data from independent household
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surveys. Of course, the estimated level of inequality depended on the choice of data and
the methods.
The CHIP, which has published estimates of China’s national Gini coefficient for the
years 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007, and now 2013, provides the longest-running set of
independent estimates of China’s national income inequality. Past CHIP studies have
indicated a steady increase in the national Gini coefficient, from 0.38 in 1988 to 0.45 in
1995, 0.46 in 2002, and 0.49 in 2007 (Griffin and Zhao 1993, p. 50; Riskin, Zhao, and Li
2001; Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular, 2008, p. 19; Li, Sato, and Sicular 2013, p. 31). These
results have been widely cited. As will be discussed below, the estimates for 2013 show
for the first time a decline in national income inequality.
In 2013, after publication of some surprisingly high estimates of China’s Gini
coefficient by researchers at Southwest University of Finance and Economics, the NBS
finally released official estimates of the national Gini coefficient for 2003 through 2012.
Since then, each year the NBS has published an estimate of the national Gini coefficient.
According to these official estimates, the national Gini coefficient rose from 0.479 in
2003 to 0.491 in 2008, after which it gradually declined to 0.462 in 2015. But in 2016 it
increased slightly to 0.465 (see Figure 1.1).
[Figure 1.1 about here]
Southwest University of Finance and Economics has published estimates of China’s
national Gini coefficient based on its independent household survey, the China
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Household Financial Survey (CHFS). Its high estimates of the Gini, which exceed 0.60
(Southwest University of Finance and Economics 2012), have attracted wide attention;
however, some observers have critiqued these high numbers. For example, Yue and Li
(2013a, 2013b) point out that the Gini coefficients estimated using the CHFS data are
overstated because of a sampling bias in the survey and defects in the CHFS data. One of
the defects is an oversampling of households in more developed urban and
less-developed rural areas. Another defect is that the CHFS questionnaire contains few
questions about household income, asking households to recall aggregated categories of
their income. Such questions would cause an understatement of income for rural
households that have income from farming and sidelines.
Other independent estimates, including those by the CHIP, are lower than those
based on the CFHS. Since 2010, the Institute of Social Science Survey of Peking
University has conducted the China Family Panel Study (CFPS) household survey, which
collects more detailed information than the CFHS on household income. Another
independent household survey is the China General Social Survey (CGSS), conducted by
researchers at Renmin University of China in collaboration with the University of
Minnesota and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

Using data from

these two surveys, researchers have calculated estimates of China’s national Gini
coefficient for household income.
Figure 1.2 shows alternative estimates of the national Gini coefficient during several

29

recent comparable years. The CHIP estimates are similar to those published by the NBS,
which is not surprising given that the CHIP uses a subsample of the NBS household
survey sample and calculates income using income data from the NBS household survey.
Differences in measured inequality between the CHIP income definition and other
estimates are partly due to the inclusion of imputed rents on owner-occupied housing.
Other independent estimates based on data from the CHFS, CGSS, and CFPS surveys
generally give higher levels of inequality than the CHIP, but most show a decline in
inequality in recent years.
[Figure 1.2 about here]
Different estimates of national inequality have different strengths and weaknesses.
The CHIP estimates have several advantages. First, the CHIP income variables are based
on data collected in real time using diaries, which is better able to capture household
earnings from a wide variety of sources and amounts, including both cash and in-kind,
than the year-end recall method used in most independent household surveys. This
feature allows for a more accurate measurement of the income of households with
multiple and informal sources of income, such as those engaged in farming,
self-employment, and household businesses. Such households, for example, rural and
migrant households, tend to be at the middle and lower end of the income distribution.
Consequently, estimates of inequality using income data based on the recall method tend
to be overstated.
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Second, the CHIP researchers have paid close attention to definition and
measurement issues of household income and use the CHIP data to develop alternative
income measures (adjusted NBS income, CHIP income) that are more consistent across
time and with international standards. Comparisons of estimates of the Gini coefficient
calculated using the alternative measures of income provide information about the
robustness of the Gini and its sensitivity to different assumptions (see Chapter 2).
Additional strengths of the CHIP estimates include (a) the household interviews
were conducted by professional survey enumerators with oversight by the CHIP research
team; (b) the CHIP surveys cover a long span of years in a consistent, transparent way; (c)
the sample size of the CHIP survey is large and has broad provincial and regional
coverage; and (d) the CHIP datasets contain detailed information on income and
consumption components, which allows substantiation and analysis of inequality
estimates. Most alternative, independent surveys do not share all these features. Of
course, the CHIP survey data are not perfect. For example, they share many of the same
weaknesses as the NBS household surveys. Several chapters in this book use
methodologies

to

address

some

of

these

weaknesses,

for

under-representation of migrant households and of ultra-rich households.

VI.

Key Findings
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example

the

The chapters in this book all use the CHIP 2013 survey data, and most chapters also use
data from previous rounds of the CHIP to understand changes over time.

Each chapter

analyzes a different topic. Most chapters analyze aspects of household income and
inequality, but several examine other, related topics, such as patterns of consumption,
wealth, and poverty. Several key findings and cross-cutting themes emerge from the
chapters.

Finding 1: Income inequality declined, but the decline was not entirely robust.

Estimates based on the CHIP household survey data show a decline in national inequality
from 2007 to 2013.

This decline is a new and notable departure from the secular

increase in inequality in earlier decades. The magnitude of the decline is in the range of 5
percent to 11 percent, depending on the definition of income (see Chapter 2). This
decline is evident in the official as well as most independent estimates (Figure 1.2). The
official (NBS) estimates, for example, indicate that the national Gini coefficient was
down slightly, by 2 percent, from 2007 to 2013; if measured from 2008 to 2013, the
decline was 4 percent (Figure 1.2 and NBS 2016).
Further analysis, however, reveals that the decline was not entirely robust. As
discussed in Chapter 2, adjusting for geographic differences in the cost of living reduces,
and possibly eliminates, the decline; moreover, adjustments for an undercounting of the
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income of ultra-rich households may yield an increase in inequality. Although these
adjustments rely on incomplete information and fairly strong assumptions, they indicate
that the measured decline in inequality reflects, at least in part, differential changes in the
cost of living among regions and the growing importance (and under-representation) of
the top tail of the income distribution. In addition, one may question the statistical
significance of the measured decline in inequality. Yang and Yang (2015), who use
bootstrap methods and the CHIP 2007 data to estimate confidence intervals for the
official estimates of the national Gini coefficient from 2008 to 2013, conclude that some
but not all of the five annual declines in the Gini during these years are statistically
significant.
Regardless, the decline in the CHIP’s base estimates of national inequality is a new
and important finding that points to equalizing processes. The decline reflects
across-the-board reductions in inequality for most components of household income
(Chapter 2), as well as narrowing gaps between some subgroups, for example,
urban/rural (Finding 2), the East/Center/West regions (Finding 3), rural Han/minorities
(Chapter 9), and urban male/female (Chapter 12). Factors contributing to the decline in
national inequality include the large government stimulus program and recent
demographic shifts, which have benefited lower-income earners, and the expansion of
distributional policies and social welfare programs that were initiated under Hu Jintao
and Wen Jiabao and have continued and expanded under Xi Jinping. Such contributing

33

factors are examined elsewhere in this volume (for example, Chapters 2, 10, 11, and 13).
Nevertheless, the sensitivity of the estimated decline to different adjustments and
assumptions, as well as the presence of disequalizing processes (e.g., Finding 4), indicate
that the decline in China’s national inequality remains fragile.

Finding 2: The urban-rural income gap narrowed.

Past increases in national inequality have been closely associated with an ongoing and
substantial widening of the gap between urban and rural incomes. According to CHIP
estimates, by 2007 the average urban household income per capita had reached 4.0 times
that of rural households, an extremely high ratio by international standards. 16 From 2007
to 2013, however, the trend was reversed and the income gap between rural and urban
households narrowed markedly to 2.6, a ratio not seen in the CHIP data since the first
round of the survey in 1988. This reversal is robust across different income definitions
and adjustments for cost of living differentials (Chapter 2); it is also evident in the
official data published by the NBS. This narrowing of the urban-rural gap is an important
factor underlying the decline in national inequality.
The narrowing urban-rural income gap after 2007 is the result of relatively slow

16

The gaps reported here are calculated as the ratio of average per capita income of formal urban
households to the average per capita income of rural households. Including rural-to-urban
migrant households in the calculation somewhat reduces the ratio but it does not change the trend
over time. See Chapter 2 for estimates that include migrants.
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income growth in urban households and rapid income growth in rural households
(Chapters 2, 5, and 7). From 2007 to 2013 rural incomes rose at an average annual rate
exceeding 10 percent (in constant prices), substantially outpacing growth in previous
years. The largest contributor to rural income growth was wage income, reflecting the
tightening labor market for lower-skilled and rural workers after the financial crisis;
however, rapid growth is also seen in most other sources of rural income, including
income from assets, transfers, pensions, and non-agricultural businesses. The only major
source of rural income that grew slowly was income from farming. Further analysis of
patterns in rural income growth can be found in Chapters 2 and 5.
Although the urban-rural income gap narrowed, income inequality within urban
areas and within rural areas continued to expand. From 2007 to 2013 the Gini coefficient
of income inequality within urban areas rose from 0.34 to 0.37, and that within rural
areas rose from 0.37 to 0.41 (Chapters 2, 5, and 7).

Finding 3: Income gaps within, rather than between, the East/West/Center regions
remained the main source of national inequality.

During the first decades of the reform period, economic growth in eastern China
outpaced that in the other regions, leading to a widening of the regional income gaps.
After 2000, the West and Center regions began to catch up. Analyses of the CHIP data for
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2002 and 2007 reveal that the regional income gaps narrowed (Li, Luo, and Sicular 2013).
This trend continued from 2007 to 2013. Notably, from 2007 to 2013 household income
in the West basically caught up with that in the Center, and the East`s lead over the other
regions continued to shrink. In 2007 the average household income per capita in the East
was nearly double that in the Center and more than double that in the West. In 2013
income in the East was only 50 to 60 percent higher than that in the Center and West
(Chapter 2). After adjusting for regional differences in cost of living, in 2013 income in
the East was only 20–30 percent higher than that in the other regions. (See Chapter 2.)
The ongoing narrowing of the regional income gaps contributed to the decline in
national inequality from 2007 to 2013. By 2013, interregional income gaps contributed
less than 10 percent of national inequality (4 percent after adjustments for regional
differences in the cost of living) (Chapter 2; Li, Luo, and Sicular 2013). 17
The shrinking regional income gaps reflect several factors. One is the expanding
interregional flow of labor, which has led to a gradual narrowing of regional wage gaps.
A second factor is the government's regional development policies, including the Western
Development Strategy, implemented during the past ten years (see Li, Sato, and Sicular
2013), which have supported economic growth in the West (Liu, Wang, and Hu 2009). A
third factor is the recent trend of relocating factories and businesses from higher-wage

17

Different income definitions and adjustments for differences in the cost of living among
regions change the size of the regional income gaps but do not alter the trends. Adjustments for
differences in the cost of living reduce the contribution of regional income gaps to national
inequality to less than 5 percent. See Chapter 2.
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eastern provinces to lower-wage central and western provinces. Considering these
circumstances, national inequality in the foreseeable future will likely remain a reflection
of inequality within, rather than among, the East/Center/West regions.

Finding 4: Household wealth has grown markedly over time and is now a key factor
contributing to income inequality.

The CHIP 2002 and CHIP 2013 datasets contain detailed information on the components
of household wealth, including the value of household holdings of real estate, financial
assets, productive assets, and durable consumer goods. As a result, for these two years it
is possible to estimate the total value and distribution of household net wealth. Chapter 4,
which discusses this issue, reports that from 2002 to 2013 Chinese household wealth
grew at an average annual rate of 17 percent, outpacing the growth in household income
and GDP. Income derived from wealth also grew rapidly, thus, on average, by 2013 asset
income accounted for 17 percent of total household income. 18
Household wealth in China is not distributed equally. Inequality of wealth as
measured by the Gini coefficient and calculated using the CHIP data was 0.62 in 2013
(Chapter 4). The actual level of wealth inequality is likely much higher than this due to
an under-representation of the wealthiest households in the CHIP sample. Chapter 4,
18

Asset income here includes income from imputed rents on owner-occupied housing plus
income from other assets. See Chapter 2.
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using several different approaches to adjust the estimates for non-responses and
under-reporting, reports that such adjustments yield a Gini coefficient of wealth
inequality in the range of 0.63–0.72. With or without such adjustments, inequality of
wealth remains considerably higher than inequality of income.
The expansion of household wealth in China is a relatively new phenomenon that
emerged in the early 2000s following the privatization of housing and the development
of housing and financial markets. Substantial price increases for real estate and other
assets in the ensuing years led to rapid increases in the value of household-owned assets,
especially in the urban areas (see Chapter 4). Owned housing remains the largest single
component of wealth. Although housing wealth is not distributed equally, near universal
home ownership in China indicates that virtually all households, both rich and poor, hold
wealth.
This expansion of household wealth has implications for income inequality. CHIP
estimates reveal that in 2007 income from assets contributed 11 percent to national
income inequality and in 2013 income from assets contributed 19 percent to national
income inequality (Chapter 2). This increase occurred even though during this period
income from assets became more equally distributed

because asset income remains one

of the most unequally distributed components of income (Chapter 2). Short-term
measures to cool real-estate markets or to fight corruption may have had a temporary
cooling effect on inequality due to wealth, but without longer-term, systematic policies,
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such as property or inheritance taxes, growing wealth will continue to pose a challenge
for China’s income distribution.

Finding 5: The number of households attaining levels of income comparable to those of
middle-class households in the developed world grew rapidly and for the first time such
households constituted a substantial share of the population.

Due to the rapid macroeconomic growth, between 2007 and 2013 China moved up the
ranks in the World Bank’s country classifications from a lower-middle-income country to
an upper-middle-income country. Concurrently, a growing proportion of Chinese
households joined the ranks of the global middle class. Chapter 3 analyzes trends in
China’s middle class as defined in relation to an international standard, that is, as being
neither poor nor rich relative to the median income in the developed world (the EU). By
this definition, China's middle class was equal to 7 percent of the population in 2007, but
it expanded to 19 percent of the population in 2013.

Thus, the period of study saw a

new development in China—the emergence of a substantial middle class, with incomes
comparable to those of the middle classes in higher-income countries.
Further analysis reveals that the Chinese middle class is largely an urban
phenomenon. In 2013 90 percent of China’s middle-class population was urban.
One-third of China’s urban population was middle class, as compared to only 4 percent
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of the rural population (Chapter 3). China’s middle class, so defined, remains in the top
deciles of China’s income distribution and thus is relatively well-off by domestic
standards. Consequently, growth of this middle class does not explain the decline in
national income inequality from 2007 to 2013, which instead reflects a rapid growth of
incomes in the bottom half of China’s domestic income distribution (Chapter 2).

Finding 6: The population living in absolute poverty continued to decline and it is now
relatively small, but the severity of poverty among those who remain poor and rising
relative poverty pose continuing challenges.

In the past decades, China has made great strides in reducing the number and proportion
of people living in absolute poverty. For example, as measured using the current official
absolute poverty line, the incidence of absolute poverty in rural China fell from 76
percent in 1988 to 31 percent in 2002, 19 percent in 2007, and then it halved again to
only 9 percent in 2013 (Chapter 6). The level of those living in absolute poverty in the
urban areas is much lower than that of those living in absolute poverty in the rural areas
but shows a similar downward trend (Chapter 7).
Estimates of poverty depend on the choice of the poverty line and the poverty index.
The poverty line can be set equal to an absolute level of income (an absolute poverty line)
or it can set relative to the median income (a relative poverty line). In addition, the
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poverty index can measure the proportion of the population living below the poverty line
(the poverty rate or the headcount ratio) or it can measure the depth (the poverty gap) or
the severity (the squared poverty gap) of poverty.
As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, poverty declined in terms of some of these
alternative measures. Estimates of the depth and severity of absolute poverty in both rural
and urban areas, however, revealed only a minor change, and in some cases, they
increased. These results point to the challenges of addressing the stubborn causes of
poverty among those households that remain poor. Furthermore, most estimates of
relative poverty increased from 2007 to 2013. As countries develop and move into
upper-middle and high levels of GDP per capita, policy makers turn their attention from
absolute to relative deprivation.

VII.

Conclusions

The analyses in this book reveal new, promising trends in China’s inequality since 2007.
Importantly, national inequality (at least by standard estimates) has declined, the
urban-rural income gap has narrowed substantially, and a significant middle class relative
to that in the developed world is emerging. Some recent patterns are continuations of
positive past trends, for example, the ongoing decline of absolute poverty and the
catching up of household incomes in the Center and West.
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Nevertheless, challenges remain. The decline in national inequality is not robust to
adjustments for changes in the relative costs of living or for the under-representation of
incomes at the top tail of the distribution. This sensitivity suggests that the decline in
inequality at best is fragile. In addition, growth in holdings of household wealth has
emerged as an increasingly disequalizing force.

Much of this wealth originated from

non-market, non-transparent processes such as the housing reforms, and as yet few
mechanisms or policies exist to counteract the rising wealth inequality. Poverty among
the remaining poor and the rising relative poverty continue to pose stubborn problems.
Since 2000 and continuing through 2013, the Chinese government pursued a broad
array of policies to address income inequality and poverty. Analyses of the CHIP 2013
data suggest that such programs benefit lower-income households and they have
contributed to the decline in inequality. Still, the impact of China’s distributional policies
is uneven and it has differed among programs, regions, and groups. For example, the
redistributive impact of public transfer payments was much greater in the urban areas
than it was in the rural areas, and urban pension income widened national income
inequality, whereas rural transfers under the minimum income guarantee (dibao) and the
rural pension programs narrowed national income inequality.
The analyses in this book provide a starting point for understanding recent trends in
inequality and poverty in China, but they leave many questions unanswered.

What

factors underlie the recent rapid growth in rural incomes, and is such growth sustainable?
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How exactly do specific policy programs, e.g., dibao, pensions, and taxation, influence
incomes? What are the implications for inequality of broader macroeconomic trends in
China, such as the slowing GDP growth, migration and urbanization, rising levels of
education, and the aging population? Further research and ongoing data-collection efforts,
such as those in the CHIP project, are needed to answer these questions as well as to
determine whether inequality in China has indeed passed a turning point and will
continue to decline in the future.
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Table 1.1. CHIP 2013 household sample: Composition by region and province

Province

Region
(1=East;
2=Center;
3=West)

Number of
Planned number Actual number of
administrative
of sample
sample
units (city districts
households
households
and counties)

Beijing

1

7

1,200

1,145

Shanxi

2

16

1,300

1,276

Liaoning

1

19

1,300

1,108

Jiangsu

1

21

1,600

1,485

Shandong

1

18

1,600

1,196

Anhui

2

18

1,300

1,526

Henan

2

22

1,800

1,614

Hubei

2

16

1,400

1,289

Hunan

2

16

1,300

1,267

Guangdong

1

16

1,600

1,534

Chongqing

3

8

1,000

988

Sichuan

3

19

1,600

1,351

Yunnan

3

11

1,000

1,105

Gansu

3

11

1,000

1,006

Xinjiang

3

16

1,000

1,058

Total

1, 2, and 3

234

20,000

18,948

Notes:
1. The actual number of sample households shown in the last column are the number of
households for which data were collected using the independent CHIP questionnaire (except for
Xinjiang, where the CHIP questionnaire could not be administered, but the NBS provided
additional data from its survey for 1,058 households). Note that the actual number of sample
households for which the NBS provided data to the CHIP is slightly different from these
numbers.
2. Discrepancies between the planned and actual numbers of sample households are due to
several reasons; in most cases it was because survey workers were unable to find household
members at the time of the survey, e.g., due to migration or no adult members of a rural
household were at home.
52

2. The NBS variables are available for all the sample provinces. The CHIP variables are
available for fourteen of the fifteen sample provinces (not for Xinjiang).
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Table 1.2. Criteria used to decide which CHIP survey questionnaire was administered
to which household

Questionnaire
administered

Criteria
English

Chinese

Urban

Head of household has a
non-agricultural hukou;
place of residence can be
either the same or not the
same as the place of the
hukou registration.

户主有非农业户口（包括改为居民户口
时的户口性质是非农业户口），包括本地
非农业户口(包括改为居民户口时的户
口性质是非农业户口）和外地非农业户
口(包括改为居民户口时的户口性质是
非农业户口）。

Rural

Head of household has an
agricultural hukou, and the
place of residence and the
place of the hukou
registration are the same.

指户主有农业户口(包括改为居民户口
时的户口性质是农业户口)而且户口所
在地是现住的乡镇（街道）内。

Migrant

Head of household has an
agricultural hukou, and the
place of residence and the
place of the hukou
registration are different.

指户主有农业户口(包括改为居民户口
时的户口性质是农业户口)而且户口所
在地是现住的乡镇（街道）外。

Note: In locations that carried out the hukou reform that eliminates an agricultural versus
non-agricultural distinction, the choice of questionnaire was decided based on whether the
household head had an agricultural or a non-agricultural hukou at the time of the hukou reform.
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Table 1.3. Composition of the CHIP samples in urban, rural, and migrant households
Number of households

% of sample

Urban

7,174

38.0

Rural

10,973

58.1

726

3.9

18,873

100.0

Migrant
Total

Source: CHIP 2013 survey, unweighted.
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Figure 1.1: Official estimates of China’s national Gini coefficient, 2003–2016
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Sources: The Gini coefficients for 2003–2015 come from Department of Household Surveys,
National Bureau of Statistics (2016, p. 407). The 2016 estimate is from the press conference on
China’s economic situation, Director of the NBS Ning Jizhe, January 20, 2017. See
http://finance.china.com.cn/news/gnjj/20170120/4077373.shtml.
Accessed July 17, 2017.
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Figure 1.2: Alternative estimates of China’s national Gini coefficient
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Notes: CHIP estimates (A) are for the NBS definition of income (unadjusted NBS income), and
(B) are for the CHIP income definition (CHIP income). See text and Chapter 2 for more details.
Sources: NBS estimates are from Department of Household Surveys, National Bureau of
Statistics (2016); CHIP estimates are from Chapter 2; CFPS and CGSS estimates are from Xie
and Zhou (2014); CHFS estimates are from Gan (2017).
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